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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
JACOB ROSS HALE, 
Defendant/Appellant 
Case No. 990939-CA 
Priority No. 2 
ARGUMENT 
ISSUE: THE BAILIFFS' STATEMENTS IN THE PRESENCE OF THE 
JURORS CONSTITUTES A CONSEQUENTIAL REMARK GIVING RISE 
TO AN UNREBUTTED PRESUMPTION OF PREJUDICE. 
The State asserts that there was no consequential juror 
contact such that a presumption of prejudice arose in Appellant 
Jacob Halefs ("Hale") trial. See State's Brief ("S.B.") at 13-
19. The State's position is without merit. 
A. The Bailiffs' Remarks Constitute a "Contact." 
The State asserts "this case does not involve a contact, let 
alone a conversation, between a juror and a trial participant." 
S.B. 14. "Accordingly, . . . the trial court reasonably 
determined that a mistrial was unwarranted." S.B. 15 (footnote 
omitted). The State's assertion oversimplifies the term 
"contact" as it is used in Utah case law. 
As an initial matter, the remark "guilty, guilty, guilty" is 
a "contact" to the extent that it was uttered in the immediate 
presence of the jury and at least one juror overheard it and 
could testify to it when questioned by the trial judge. 
R.247[120,130]. As such, the remark was communicated to at least 
{ 
one of the jurors, rendering it a contact. See Webster's New 
World College Dictionary (4th ed.) (defining "contact" as "the 
state or fact of being in touch, communication, or association 
(with)"). 
In addition, a comment need not be a verbal exchange or a 
conversation with a juror in order to be a "contact" under Utah 
case law. The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Pike, 712 P.2d 277, 
280 (Utah 1985), and State v. Erickson, 749 P.2d 620, 621 (Utah 
1987), does not limit its holdings to conversations alone. 
Rather, the Court specifically refers to "contacts," recognizing 
that any sort of communication, one-way or two-way, may prejudice 
a defendant if it is improper. Pike, 712 P.2d at 280; see also 
Erickson, 749 P.2d at 621 ("prejudice will be presumed from any 
contact") (emphasis added). Accordingly, the mere fact that the 
bailiffs were not conversing with the jury when the remark was 
made does not render it a non-contact. R.247[129-31]. "The 
'scope and subject matter [of the contact], . . .' so long as 
more than mere pleasantries, . . . [is] irrelevant." Logan City 
v. Carlsen, 799 P.2d 224, 227 (Utah App. 1990) (Orme, J., 
concurring). . 
Finally, a contact need not be with a "trial participant" to 
fall under Pike. See Carlsen, 799 P.2d at 226. This Court has 
already rejected such a proposition, stating, "the [Utah] Supreme 
Court made no such distinction and precluded any unauthorized 
2 
contact by witnesses, attorneys or court personnel." Id. at 226 
(rejecting appellee's argument that "no prejudice occurred 
because the incident involved a bailiff rather than a witness for 
the state, as was the case in Erickson and Pike") (citing State 
v. Erickson, 749 P.2d 620, 621 (Utah 1987)) (emphasis added); see 
also State v. Day, 815 P.2d 1345, 1349 (Utah App. 1991) 
(declining to address propriety of contact by bailiff on 
preservation grounds). In so reasoning, this Court held that 
statements made by a bailiff, appropriately characterized as 
"court personnel," which touched upon the issue of sentencing 
were consequential and merited a mistrial. Carlsen, 799 P.2d at 
226-27. By the same reasoning, the remark in this case, made by 
a bailiff who is "court personnel," implicates the Pike rule. 
In light of the foregoing, the State's assertion that the 
remark did not amount to a contact is without merit. 
B. The Bailiffs1 Remarks Are Consequential And Give 
Rise To A Presumption of Prejudice. 
The State erroneously asserts that the "guilty, guilty, 
guilty" remark was not consequential. S.B.16-17; R.247[130]. A 
remark is consequential, giving rise to a rebuttable presumption 
of prejudice, when it goes beyond a mere incidental, unintended, 
and brief contact. See Pike, 712 P.2d at 280; Erickson, 749 P.2d 
at 621. A remark rises to the level of consequential if it is 
something other than a mere "civility," Erickson, 749 P.2d at 
621, such as "fHellof or fGood morning.1" State v. Jonas, 793 
3 
( 
P.2d 902, 909 (Utah App. 1990); see also Carlsen, 799 P.2d at 227 
Cany contact [gives rise to rebuttable presumption of prejudice
 ( 
if] 'more than a brief incidental contact where only remarks of 
civility are exchanged1") (citing Erickson, 749 P.2d at 621) 
(Orme, J., concurring) . < 
In light of the foregoing, and for the reasons set forth in 
Hale's opening brief ("A.B."), the "guilty, guilty, guilty" 
remark was anything but a mere civility. See A.B. 17-21; ' 
R.247[130]. Indeed, the comment touched on a sensitive issue 
going to the crux of the trial - the guilt-or-innocence question. 
Id. at 17; see also Carlsen, 799 P.2d at 226 (mistrial required 
where bailiff's comment to jury, although not related to specific 
case, "touched on the extremely sensitive issue of sentencing"). 
For this reason, the State's reliance upon Jonas, 793 P.2d 
at 908, is misplaced. See S.B. 16-17. The statement at issue in 
Jonas was an explanation made by a bailiff to the jury about the 
absence of another juror. 793 P.2d at 908.1 This Court held it 
was "an incidental contact raising no presumption of prejudice" 
because "no 'conversation' took place, in the normal sense of an 
'oral exchange of sentiments, observations, opinions [or] 
ideas.'" Id. at 908-09. Moreover, the content of the remark had 
only a "tenuous connection to the subject of the trial." Id. at 
1
 The bailiff involved in Jonas stated, "'I went in and I 
told them that Mr. Davis wouldn't be in because his sister was 
the lady that was shot out in West Valley.'" 793 P.2d at 908. 
4 
909. Hence, the comment did not affect "the jury's judgment 
regarding their verdict" nor did it lend and "any appearance of 
impropriety" to the trial. Id. at 909-10. The phrase "guilty, 
guilty, guilty," R.247[130], by contrast, communicates a strong 
and central idea in the criminal setting and, therefore, bears a 
direct relationship to the subject of Hale's trial. 
A more instructive case is Carlsen, wherein this Court held 
that remarks from a bailiff, although not directly touching on 
the specific case, gave rise to an unrebutted presumption of 
prejudice. See 799 P.2d at 226. The bailiff's remark concerned 
the "difference between circuit and district court jurisdiction, 
and the sentences for misdemeanors and felonies." Id. In 
holding that a mistrial was merited, the Court stated, 
We find it particularly troublesome that the 
unauthorized conversation between the bailiff and the 
jury concerned the sensitive subject of sentencing. 
The juror's minds should be free of extraneous thought 
as to possible sentences because such thought would 
tend to interfere with their concentration on 
defendant's guilt or innocence. 
Id. at 227. 
For the same reasons set forth in Carlsen, the remark at 
issue here is consequential in that it touches upon the sensitive 
issue of guilt. Id. The juror's thought processes should have 
been focused on the facts of the case without the infecting 
overlay of the "guilty, guilty, guilty" remark ringing in their 
minds. Id.; R.247[130]. To the extent that the jury was 
5 
infected with this bias toward guilt, Hale's right to a fair 
trial by an impartial jury was compromised. Accordingly, the
 ( 
trial court erred in failing to grant a mistrial.2 
CONCLUSION 
In light of the foregoing, and for the reasons set forth in i 
Halefs opening brief, Hale respectfully requests this Court to 
reverse the lower court's denial of his suppression motion and 
his motion for a new trial, and remand for further proceedings. 
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2
 Hale submits on his opening brief in response to the 
State's argument that any presumption of prejudice was adequately 
rebutted, see A.B. 17-21, as well as its argument concerning the 
trial court's erroneous denial of his motion to suppress 
unreliable and tainted identification testimony. See A.B. Point 
II. 
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